INFLUENCE OF POVERTY ON VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN KENYA:
A CASE STUDY OF MOMBASA COUNTY BETWEEN 2007 TO 2017

THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES (SHSS) IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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SPRING 2019
STUDENT’S DECLARATION

The thesis is my original work and has not been submitted to any other college, institution for an academic award

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ABSTRACT

The study sought to examine the influence of Poverty on Violent Extremism in Kenya: a case of Mombasa County. The study aimed to answer the following research questions: what are the predominant causes of poverty in Mombasa County? What is the extent of poverty prevalence on violent extremism in Mombasa County? and what is the link between poverty and violent extremism in Mombasa County? The target population of this study was the County government of Mombasa, World Values Surveys, UN records, National government records, and non-benefit associations (NGOs) records. Secondary data, which is the main data for the analyses, was gathered from publications dependent on information from the County government reports, World Values Surveys, UN records, national government records, non-benefit associations (NGOs) records, media articles, and concentrates identified with the present subject. Data was analysed using Descriptive Analysis, Pearson’s Simple Correlation Analysis. The results of the Meta analysis indicates that poverty levels was the main factor contributing to violent extremism. The findings show that poverty rates in Mombasa is around 38% and has been consistent according to Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (2015) and unemployment is estimated at 15% in 2009. The analysis shows that there is high labor migration from the rural areas amongst working age population aged between 15-64 years, but also many non-coastal people. According to the results of the analysis, radicalization and recruitment into violent extremism is the foremost security threat in Mombasa and high numbers of youths are being recruited to join Al Shabaab. As per this examination, it has been contended that for every four to five houses there is a radicalization issue in the Mombasa. It is concluded that countries that have reduced poverty and improved living conditions on a broad scale have developed comprehensive social protection systems covering a majority of the population. The study has also concluded that by helping people living in poverty to address trade-offs between meeting their immediate needs and securing future livelihoods, social security fund measures can encourage the accumulation of productive assets and help households to manage risk. The results of the analysis show that, sustained poverty reduction cannot be achieved unless equality of opportunity and access to basic services is ensured.
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Above all else, I give my appreciation and humble thankfulness to the Almighty God for the endowment of life, great wellbeing, a sound personality and celestial fortune that empowered me to think of this exploration venture.

Furthermore, I wish to accord my Supervisor, Joseph Kimani, unique affirmation, for outfitting me with the learning and aptitudes in composing the undertaking with incredible understanding, consolation and direction all through the exploration venture by perusing and redressing my work. God Bless You
DEDICATION

This thesis is devoted to my cherishing family for their help, persistence and support amid the whole process. May the Almighty richly reward you with what you deserve.
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<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>GCTF</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GTI</td>
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<td>ISIL</td>
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<td>LTTE</td>
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<td>MIT</td>
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<td>OPHI</td>
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CHAPTER ONE

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Problem

The expanding reach and destructive consequences of violent extremism are among the major challenges to peace faced in today’s world (Institute of Development Studies, 2017). Numbers of fatalities resulting from terrorist attacks perpetrated by violent extremist groups have risen steeply over the past two decades. In 2015, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Daesh), Boko Haram, the Taliban, and Al-Qaida were responsible for 74 percent of all deaths from terrorism, with numerous countries across the world affected (Shahbaz, 2014). Poverty, deprivation and state abuse of power are driving young Africans to join violent extremist groups, such as Boko Haram, al-Shabab and Islamic State (United Nations Development Programme, 2014). The world’s most dangerous nations are also among the poorest. For instance, the Global Terrorism Index (2013) revealed that lower-middle-income countries accounted for seven of the 10 countries most affected by violent extremism and terrorism (Lumumba, 2014). Nations such as Iraq, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Nigeria, which were among the 10 most dangerous countries, also struggle with rampant poverty (Amendah, 2013).

Poverty is a blight, and one that disproportionately affects sub-Saharan Africa. It is a vast and complex issue whose tentacles reach into many areas, including climate change, sustainable development and crucially global security (Terje, 2013). The link between poverty and violent extremism is compelling, and means that in order to address extremism, fight against inequality must come first (Kwaja, 2014). Deprivation and marginalization, underpinned by weak governance, are primary forces driving young Africans into violent extremism, (UNDP, 2014). In Kenya as in many other developing countries, the regions acknowledged to be flashpoints for radicalisation and violent extremism are synonymous with extreme poverty, high illiteracy levels and under-investment in basic services (Jourde, 2015). The majority of those living in these regions have for years believed themselves to be excluded from the national development agenda.
The emergence of various armed ‘extremist’ groups in the Greater Horn of Africa, particularly al-Shabaab and its affiliates, has elicited a range of political, security, and developmental responses (Siegle, 2013). Africa’s Greater Horn is an area characterised by rich cultural and religious diversity within and between multiple communities. However, marred by low levels of human security and growing economic inequality, the region has emerged as a hotspot for violent extremist activity (Nickels, 2016).

Although not the only armed extremist actor in the region, the group al-Shabaab, meaning ‘the Youth’ in Arabic, has been responsible for the majority of terrorist incidents in the Greater Horn area over the last decade (Javed, 2013). While al-Shabaab emerged in Somalia in 2005 as an insurgent movement with national aims, it has since evolved into a transnational actor, carrying out attacks in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda (Kwame, 2014). Mung’atu (2013) contends that increasing inequality hinders economic growth and undermines social cohesion, increases political and social tensions and drives instability and conflict.

1.1.1 Violent Extremism in Kenya

Violent extremism is understood as ‘advocating, engaging in, preparing, or otherwise supporting ideologically motivated or justified violence to further social, economic or political objectives’ (Sattar, 2014). Violent extremism refers to radicalised individuals who are prepared to engage in, or actively support acts of violence in furtherance of radically illiberal, undemocratic political systems or ideologies (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015). Violent extremism is not limited to one ideology or to specific geographical regions in the world, and Africa has not been immune to the impact of violent extremism and terrorism (Clarke, 2015). In Nigeria and Somalia, for example, violent extremist organisations began as ethnically homogenous movements with purely domestic concerns – the overthrow of their respective governments. Over time they have evolved toward more ambitious political goals and established an active presence in neighbouring states (Baker, 2013).

Groups such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Boko Haram have terrorised West Africa, while the Lord’s Resistance Army and al-Shabaab have committed atrocities across Central and East Africa, and the Horn (Gallagher, 2013), while al-Shabaab, an al-Qaeda affiliate, is seeking to create an Islamic state in Somalia (Bratton, 2013). As early as 2010, al-Shabaab’s leaders ‘harboured aspirations to
establish a regional presence and recruit fighters from across countries in eastern Africa who had an understanding of their respective countries’ vulnerabilities (Penar, 2014). Al-Shabaab have also inspired the creation of several affiliated jihadist groups and autonomous networks, which have also organized attacks’.

Kenya experienced at least 200 terrorist attacks from al-Shabaab between 2008 and 2014, resulting in the deaths of over 500 people and injuring over 1000 (National Human Rights Commission, 2016). The number of attacks stepped up after 2011 in retaliation for Operation Linda Nchi, a Kenyan military operation that deployed Kenyan troops over the border in Somali conflict zones to engage al-Shabaab. Kenyan troops were later assimilated into the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to help the Somali government suppress the al-Shabaab insurgency and bring stability back to the region (Lekalake, 2015). In September 2013, the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi was attacked by alShabaab killing 72 people and 201 were injured. In June 2014, 48 people were killed and three injured in an attack in Mpeketoni, in Lamu County on the Kenyan coast (Ministry of Internal Security, 2016). In addition, at least 15 were killed during an overnight attack at Majembeni and Poromoko villages, near Mpeketoni, for which al-Shabaab claimed responsibility in 2014. Similarly, in 2015 an attack by gunmen at the Garissa University College in north-east Kenya killed 147 and injured 79 staff and students (MIS, 2016).

There are increasing numbers of Kenyan nationals leaving the country to join al-Shabaab as well as associating with and supporting al-Shabaab in Kenya (Kagwanja, 2014). Al-Shabaab has ‘created extensive funding, recruiting and training networks in the Kenyan coast, and it has been estimated that 10% of al-Shabaab’s militants are Kenyan nationals (Thiankolu, 2014). The development context within which violent extremism is playing out in Kenya is crucial to this discussion. The interplay of development deficits and insecurity compounds and heightens the dynamics of violent extremism and its impact. The combined challenges of youth unemployment, poverty, inequality and poor governance (among other things) continue to interact in complex ways with the insecurity that results from violent extremism (Dulani, 2013). With an estimated population of 46.1 million and a poverty rate of 45.5%, Kenya is ranked by the World Bank as a middle- to low-income country (Wambua, 2013). Violent crime is a serious problem in Mombasa, Nairobi among other urban areas,
where violent robberies, home invasions and burglaries pose a significant security threat (Maore, 2013).

1.1.2 An Overview of Causes of Poverty

Steinberg (2013) defines poverty as a condition where people's basic needs for food, clothing, and shelter are not being met. Poverty often deprives people of the ability to obtain an adequate education, and a lack of education leaves many people vulnerable to negative influences (Hultman, 2015). Oftentimes, children from low income or extremely poor families only able to receive an education at madrassas or religious schools, which are targeted by violent extremists looking to indoctrinate and recruit innocent youngsters (Zeiger, 2014). Additionally, the top ten most dangerous countries in the 2012 GTI consisted of nations with high illiteracy rates.

According to Okpara (2013), poverty often goes hand-in-hand with poor governance in a nation. In fact, sometimes poor governance continues the cycle of poverty. Poor people in such nations often feel marginalized not only because of their status but also the hopelessness that comes with the justified mistrust in their government (Sebe, 2013). As a result, they might join groups that promote extremist actions in order to feel like they are being heard and their needs are being considered (Stringer, 2013). According to Stringer, the forces driving young Africans towards violent extremism include but not limited to lack of employment, healthcare, education, security and housing.

Youth unemployment in Kenya’s coastal and north-eastern counties is between 40 and 50 percent higher than the national average (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2015). Similarly, in a country where over 100 million live in poverty, similar regional variations distort the livelihood prospects of north-eastern Nigerians. In Kenya, recent data from the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Index (OPHI) on multidimensional poverty illustrates this trend: populations living in the coastal regions where violent extremism is more prominent experience significantly higher levels of multidimensional poverty than those in Nairobi and central regions (Muasa, 2014). In Nigeria, similar evidence of the relative impoverishment of the key states where Boko Haram has emerged and gained influence, as against the national average (Transparency International, 2015).
The notion that poverty and unemployment are important factors driving violent extremism has a long-standing place in conflict theory and policy discourse (Weber, 2014). There is agreement that poverty alone is not a sufficient explanation for violent extremism in Africa. Still, it is accepted that violent extremist groups exploit perceptions of disproportionate economic hardship or exclusion due to religious or ethnic identity, while failure to generate high and sustainable levels of growth and job creation are also critically linked (Bila, 2013). Economic factors can thus best be described as one among several sets of issues driving recruitment of individuals by violent extremist groups (Dougil, 2014).

1.1.3 Overview of Violent Extremism in Mombasa County

In recent years, Mombasa County has been rocked with violent protests and terrorist attacks blamed on Islamic extremists (Transparency International, 2015). Youths from Mombasa's Majengo, Kisauni and Old Town areas have been radicalized by extreme Muslim doctrines to attack civilians (Korir, 2015). The youths are motivated by preaching from Muslim clerics. Similarly, increased attention has been paid to the involvement of coastal women with al-Shabaab, spurred by several highly publicised incidents. In 2015, three girls were arrested, reportedly en route to Somalia to join al-Shabaab (Hassan, 2014). In addition, a woman was arrested in Mombasa and charged with attempting to recruit five youths for al-Shabaab (Guardian, 2014). Similarly, the Kenyan government identified an al-Shabaab female recruiter, as well as being responsible for grenade attacks and assassinations in Mombasa (Katumo, 2014). In 2016, two Kenyan women who were enrolled at Kampala International University, Uganda, as medical students were arrested and held on suspicion of forming a terror cell of students (Kasese, 2016). Most recently, the widow of slain Muslim cleric was linked to a terrorist network in Kenya and beyond.

Balongo (2015) argues that in Mombasa County, the community’s interaction with terrorists is as old as Kenya’s own experience with terror. The culprit associated with the US embassy attack, a Yemeni National, lived and married in Mombasa. Another dangerous terrorist was Fazul Mohamed who is reported to have lived in Mombasa County, where he supported football clubs and Madrassas from his philanthropic activities (Amisi, 2015). Further, the late Aboud Rogo worked and spent most of his life in Mombasa but hailed from Siu Island. These incidences and coincidences point
to certain factors on the ground in Mombasa County being exploited by violent extremists to plan and execute their attacks (Ndege, 2015).

Moreover, Mombasa County has been selected to join a network of cities ―"Strong Cities Network‖ across the world to combat violent extremism and promote cohesion (Mombasa County Government, 2017). Strong Cities Network (SCN) is a global initiative connecting cities and other local authorities to help protect communities by building resilience and strengthening social cohesion against violent extremism (Seme, 2015). As a member of the SCN International Steering Committee, Mombasa County is at the forefront of developing and delivering community-based strategies and locally-led approaches that contributed to building social cohesion and resilience to violent extremism (Miller, 2016). This is build a strong motivation in selecting Mombasa County for the present study.
1.2 Statement of the Problem

The importance of a state’s strength as well as its character have been emphasized by researchers and policymakers as highly pertinent to understanding violent extremism (Maxwell, 2013). The drivers of extremism in Kenya and Africa at large are largely home-grown (Kipruto, 2015). Individual militant groups emerge and evolve from local concerns, are created and run by locally situated actors, and have an agenda that focusses on the immediate context. Extremist interpretations of Islam have strong resonance among certain marginalized Muslim communities as an avenue to address perceived injustices and economic inequalities (Kwese, 2015). There are various studies which have been carried out in Kenya on the relationship between poverty and violent extremism. Masinde (2015) studied Islamic Militancy in Kenya and found that feelings of deprivation that are caused by being unemployed or the fear of unemployment can lead to extremist thoughts in people, thereby inviting them to engage in terrorist activities. Kinyanjui (2014) studied the association between economic inequality and violent extremism in north eastern Kenya. However, the studies have not had a specific focus on the link between poverty and violent extremism in Mombasa County, Kenya. This formed a good basis for the focus of the thesis.

1.3 Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study was to examine the influence of Poverty on Violent Extremism in Kenya: a case of Mombasa County.

1.4 Specific Objectives

The following specific objectives guided the study:-

1.4.1 To assess the predominant causes of poverty in Mombasa County.
1.4.2 To investigate the extent of poverty prevalence on violent extremism in Mombasa County.
1.4.3 To investigate the link between poverty and violent extremism in Mombasa County.
1.5 Research Questions

1.5.1 What are the predominant causes of poverty in Mombasa County?
1.5.2 What is the extent of poverty prevalence on violent extremism in Mombasa County?
1.5.3 What is the link between poverty and violent extremism in Mombasa County?

1.6 Significance of the Study

1.5.1 Government of Kenya
The findings of the study may assist the government in evaluating the current poverty and violent extremism and come up with strategies and policies for the extent to which the youth issues are included, as well as their operational impact on youth. The possible implications for promoting radicalisation among youth at the community level should be specifically considered.

1.5.2 Civil Society Organisations
The results may assist civil society to strengthen evidence-based approaches to programme design by designing programmes that are based on context-specific empirical research; and help them to avoid over-researching the same respondents (youth, women and communities) without them experiencing some benefit from research efforts.

1.5.3 Community-based organisations and community leaders
The results may also help community-based organisations to promote dialogue, trust building and the resolution of conflict where these issues prevail in communities, and among security and other actors in government.

1.5.3 Academia
The finding may give an insight to academia on other areas for further researches and used for future reference.
1.6 Scope of the Study

The study was limited to the influence of Poverty on Violent Extremism in Kenya: a case of Mombasa County. Descriptive research design was used incorporating panel data for ten years, between 2007 and 2017 time when Kenya has experienced challenges in fight against violent extremists especially Al-Shabaab. Many Kenyan youth from Mombasa have been radicalized to join violent extremism in and outside Kenya (Ministry of Interior, 2015). This therefore is the best time for the current topic. Panel data was gathered from the County Government of Mombasa, World Values Surveys, UN records, National Government Records, and non-benefit associations (NGOs) records.

1.7 Definitions of Key Terms

1.7.1 Violent Extremism:

Violent extremism refers to the beliefs and actions of people who support or use ideologically motivated violence to achieve radical ideological, religious or political views (Senga 2015).

1.7.2 Poverty Prevalence:

Waweru (2013) defines Poverty Prevalence as a household's inability to access wealth resources that are enough to provide for basic needs for a period of three months.

1.7.3 Marginalisation:

To marginalize a group of people means to make them feel isolated and unimportant. (Zachary, 2015).

1.7.4 Inequality:

The unfair situation in society when some people have more opportunities or money among others (Mbakari, 2014).

1.8 Chapter Summary

The purpose of this study was to examine the influence of Poverty on Violent Extremism in Kenya: a case of Mombasa County based on the following research
questions: what are the predominant causes of poverty in Mombasa County?; what is the extent of poverty prevalence on violent extremism in Mombasa County?; and what is the link between poverty and violent extremism in Mombasa County?.

Chapter one has noted that Kenya experienced at least 200 terrorist attacks from violent extremist groups particularly al-Shabaab between 2008 and 2014, resulting in the deaths of over 500 people and injuring over 1000. The problem statement has revealed that there are increasing numbers of Kenyan nationals leaving the country to join violent extremist groups as well as associating with and supporting violent extremist groups in Kenya. It has also been reported that Kenya is ranked by the World Bank as a middle- to low-income country and Violent crime is a serious problem in Mombasa, Nairobi among other urban areas, where violent robberies, home invasions and burglaries pose a significant security threat. This forms a good basis for discussion on the current topic.

The next chapter (Chapter two) reviewed the literature on poverty and its effect on violent extremis. Chapter three discussed the methodology to be used in the primary study. Chapter 4 will presents the study findings and give interpretation with relation to literature review. Chapter 5 summarises the results and give conclusions. The chapter likewise show answers to the examination inquiries in form of guidelines and suggestions.
CHAPTER TWO

2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

Chapter two examined the influence of Poverty on Violent Extremism. The chapter displayed theoretical writing in perspective of the following parameters: marginalisation; inequality; discrimination; and immigration. The chapter also presents a synopsis of the literature review. The following variables will be discussed: Causes of poverty, extent of poverty prevalence on violent extremism and the link between poverty and violent extremism.

2.2 Causes of Poverty

Poverty is a state of deprivation, measured at various levels of society: individual, household, community, national, and international; and that a view of this deprivation is dependent on one’s discipline (Collier, 2014). Poverty is multi-dimensional and that policies aimed at fighting poverty require credible evidence on poverty traps and their causes. According to World Bank (2014), 5% of global income comes from 40% of the world’s poorest population while 75% of global income is derived from 20% of the world’s rich. The World Bank Indicators continue to show that at least 80% of the world’s population lives on less than US$10 a day and over three (3) billion people of the world live on less than US$2.50 a day.

The United Nations’ Millennium Development Goal Report (2014), indicates that in 2013 there were 1.4 billion people living in extreme poverty on less than US$1.25 a day. It has been projected by UN that by 2025 there will be less than 900 million people living on a wage less than US$1.25 a day. Statistics shows that the area with a high number of people living in extreme poverty is Sub-Saharan African and followed by Southern Asia (Elbadawi, 2015). In the Democratic Republic of Congo, eight in ten residents live on less than US$2 per day. Seventy six percent (76%) of residents in India live below US$2 a day, which accounts for more than 900 million people (Justino, 2014). This situation indicates that countries with high population growth
and with limited economic resources, will find it more difficult to reduce poverty (Verwimp, 2013).

2.2.1 Political Instability

It is arguable that countries which are rich in natural resources maybe prone to civil wars due to “loot-seeking” activities (Ntale, 2013). A study done by Lwanga (2013) found that countries with both dependence upon primary commodity exports and a large diaspora significantly increase the risk of conflict. This has been a widespread phenomenon in Africa. Okidi (2015) argues that although Sudan was officially split into Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan in 2011, the recent conflict in between the split countries occurred mainly due to ongoing disagreements over how to split lucrative oil revenues. Oil, was once thought to bind the two nations together and prevent conflict because of oil fields in the South and the refineries in the North. But today, the same oil has become the reason of fuse between the split territories (Pradhan, 2013).

Ironically, during civil wars, large amounts of resources are spent on weapons which could have been better used to alleviate poverty. Apparently, both the civil wars and poverty exist in an inextricable manner. Elbadawi (2015) contend that by their detrimental nature, civil wars lead to poverty mainly due to destruction of capital, displacement of people and increased insecurity. Civil wars can be disruptive to capital or transactions-intensive activities such as roads, production of manufactures, or financial services (Mshoro, 2015). They can divert expenditure and the nation’s resources from economic services to the war efforts and they can divert portfolios from domestic investment into capital flight. For instance, the civil war and genocide that happened in the 1990-2000 period in Rwanda also caused economic impacts on the country’s provinces (Tierney, 2014). The wars resulted in more than 60% of its 8 million people living below poverty level. A report by an international group of human rights experts documented the disruption in agricultural production and in the lives of northern villagers (Gurr, 2013). Consequentially, Justino and Verwimp (2014) discovered that these previously richer provinces had then experienced lower, even negative economic growth compared to the poorer western and southern provinces. Also, they found that households whose house was destroyed or who lost land encountered a greater risk of falling into poverty.
A study by Karin (2014) shows that Africa is among those continents with unending conflicts. Among the conflicts that exist in Africa include civil wars, for instance Somalia; conflicts between nations, for instance, Eritrea and Ethiopia border wars and the continuing civil wars in Nigeria and Sudan’s Darfur area. This creates untold desolation and poverty among inhabitants.

2.2.2 Education

Kiendrebeogo and Ianchovichina (2016) used Gallup survey data from 27 developing countries to study the characteristics of violent extremism and found that the typical radicalized individual is more likely to be relatively uneducated, young, unemployed, and struggling to meet ends, and not as religious as others but more willing to sacrifice their own life for his or her beliefs. Jenkins (2011) examines 82 cases of home-grown extremism in the U.S. from 2002 through 2015 and finds that the recruits were young (average age 32 and median age 27) and had completed secondary education, with many enrolled in college but never graduating. Most were Muslim and started their journey toward radicalization online.

A study done by Grossman (2014) found that poverty is not only a problem of low incomes but it is a multidimensional problem that includes low access to opportunities for developing human capital and education. Due to the multidimensional problem, more attention needs to be focused on investment in human capital, particularly in education as a means to increase earnings, quality of jobs and improving the quality of life such as better utilization of health facilities, shelter, water and sanitation (Segeman, 2015). Statistically, the effect of education exists with rates of return as high percent per year. However, poor countries increase their poverty level due to lack of training skills, productive knowledge which transforms human beings into more valuable human capital (Piazza, 2015).

According to Clint (2014), without proper education for the respective skills and knowledge in the work force such as read, write, communicate and be able to choose different alternative choices in more informed way would lead to low earnings and therefore increase poverty level. For instance, in the United States 22.9 percent or 6.4 million people are without a high school diploma whereas only 3.6 percent or 2 million people have a college degree or higher (Merari, 2014). Education yields attractive returns, comparable with alternative rates of return, both to the individual
and to the society at large. Without education it would not broaden the base understanding among people which would deter the democratic process which in turn could not pave the way to the promotion of sustainable development, through a better understanding of the intimate relation between environment, ecology and sustainable development (Gartenstein, 2015). Thus, by strengthening democratic forces, education would help in promoting sustainable human development, making rapid social progress, including abolition of containment of the elite’s discretionary power and wider social equity (Marc, 2014).

Education can be a life empowering experience for all and what the poor needs most is empowerment (Borum, 2015). Thus, education serves at the same time both the constitutive and instrumental roles of development. While recognizing that the economic importance of education it would increase incomes, reducing poverty level, increase development of the country and increase unemployment rates (Kreuger, 2015).

According to Blair (2015) education has a direct relevance of the well-being and freedom of the people, while its indirect role is through its influence on social change and economic production. The features of poverty include non-participation or low rates of participation of children in schooling, high rates of drop out and failures, low rates of continuation in schooling, low rates of achievement and finally exclusion of the poor from education (Grame, 2013). All these aspects of education and poverty are closely related with income poverty. Individuals without a high school degree in average experience unemployment rates that are around 3 to 5 times greater than with individual with college degree (Wilberforce, 2015). In other words, poverty is predominant among illiterates and it is almost a non-existent phenomenon among educated households.

A study done by Marc (2013) notes that poverty and economic constraints keep many children from economically poor families away from school. Income poverty may force children to be out of school for various reasons and thus they are denied the opportunity of participating in schooling. A larger proportion of children from the poor families participate in low-wage employment yielding economic activities. Low-wage employment has limited benefits, poor working environment and shrinking wages which further lead to families in poverty level (Alan, 2014). For instance, s
study done by Clark (2015) shows that over 29 million workers or one fourth (24.5%) of the workforce in the United States earns poverty level wages. The poverty level wages at the market are US$7.36 as compared to US$18.07 for the total workforce. In non-wage related economic activities like household chores and in activities that may relieve their parents or adult member of the household so that they can participate in wage-related activities. Therefore due to income poverty, very few achieve level of learning or proper education. In other words, employment alone does not prevent entry into poverty if the wages are too low (Hengessi, 2013).

2.2.3 Corruption

A survey conducted by world anti-corruption (2014) revealed that there were very high corruption cases in African nations. Among the respondents who were interviewed 42 percent of them confirmed that they were asked to give bribe in order to be employed. Countries in Africa that were reported to have the highest incidences of corruption were Nigeria, Senegal and Cameroon (Akindola, 2014). This is due to the fact that many people in Africa believe that family relations are more essential than country identity. Therefore, those in power use bias and bribery for the gain of their relatives at the expense of their country. A study done by Klitgaard [16] hypothesized that corruption is more likely to occur in an environment where officials have monopolistic control over state resources such as who can gain access to the resource. While the mechanisms for holding these officials responsible for their actions are weak and this reduces private investment in that society and hence unemployment rates.

According to Shahzad (2015), corruption in income inequality can be harmful to a country’s security by adversely fuelling crime rate, limiting poverty reduction and deterring investment into the country. As inequality increases, so does the poverty level of the country. As income inequality increases, the rich have more to lose at fair political, administrative, and judicial processes but the rich also have greater resources that can be used to buy influence, both legally and illegally law making process (Zaidi, 2013). For instance in African countries, the national tax system is not regressive. However, corruption allows the rich and powerful to escape their tax obligations, hence the tax burden falls almost exclusively on the poor (Mirza, 2014). Corruption leads to the concentration of assets among a few wealthy elite that can
influence public policy and increase income inequality. Because earning power depends, to some extent, on resource endowment (including inherited wealth), the rich are able to use their wealth to further consolidate their economic and political power such as trade policies, including exchange rate, spending programs and preferential tax treatment of their assets. These policies will result in higher returns to the assets owned by the wealthy and lower returns to the assets owned by the less well-to-do, thereby increasing income inequality (Hegghammer, 2013).

Furthermore, Akbar (2014) stated that the rich can use their assets as collateral to borrow and invest in business which will therefore lead to inequality in ownership of assets that will limit the ability of the poor to borrow to increase their lifetime income and will perpetuate poverty in income inequality. Khalid (2015) argues that the choice of development strategy influences income inequality as labor intensive development strategy leads to equitable distribution of income while the opposite is true for a capital intensive development strategy. Large subsidies on capital result in a capital intensive development strategy, which increases income inequality (Thomas, 2015).

In African countries, production decisions are highly influenced by an elaborate system of taxes and subsidies. While capital is heavily subsidized, labor is taxed at a high rate with the result that businesses choose capital intensive technologies over labor intensive ones. This policy of subsidizing capital is exacerbated by high level of corruption in most African countries (Mirza, 2014). This strategy leads to low demand for labor, low wages; a strategy that effectively redistributes income from the poor to the rich since the subsidies are paid with taxes paid by the poor.

### 2.2.4 Overpopulation

A study done by Neil (2013) found that overpopulation is a severe problem in Africa which has worsened the level of poverty. There is low unemployment due to lack of enough employment opportunities. Therefore, the number of people depending on those who are employed is so high which leaves a majority of the people in poverty (Malhorta, 2016). For instance, when calamities like famine occur the high need for food in well-off cities draws foods from needy areas leaving the aged, the incapacitated and children in poverty.
Chitereka, (2015) notes that more than 500 billion dollars have been sent to African countries for the purpose of economic development; however, the money has brought little change in the long term. This might be because a large portion of the money is either spent in weapons which are bought from the developed countries. This brings no gain to the native inhabitants because the money is still sent back to developed nations.

In addition Berebbi (2015) posits that the large sums of money available in Africa are used to develop expensive projects, which bring little benefit in the long run. For instance, Ghana was the richest nation in Africa when it gained independence. But a few years later, it did not have any foreign reserves of any significance (Willy, 2013). Most of its money was spent on mega projects, which eventually became a waste of fund. An example is the Okasambo dam which had to cost billions of money in constructing it so as to provide electricity for the mining of aluminium from bauxite. However, the ores were discovered to be of too low grade and; therefore, the entire project became a waste of money.

2.3 Extent of Poverty Prevalence on Violent Extremism

Violent extremism in Africa is setting in motion a dramatic reversal of development gains and threatening to stunt prospects of development for decades to come (Akers, 2016). From 2011 to 2016, violent extremism caused 33,300 fatalities as well as widespread displacement, creating situations of pronounced and critical humanitarian need. The 2015 United Nations Plan of Action on Preventing Violent Extremism urges the global community of states to pay closer attention to the root causes and drivers of violent extremism, after decades of overconcentration on militarized approaches (Khan, 2014).

2.3.1 Migration from Rural to Urban

Some analysts argue that feelings of alienation on the part of young migrants especially recent arrivals can increase vulnerability to violent extremism, a factor which may be aggravated by unemployment or underemployment (Reno, 2014). For instance, an empirical research by Guenena (2014) into Egypt’s militant groups in the 1990s showed a high proportion of rural to urban migrants. In rapidly urbanising developing countries under great economic stress, scarcity and poverty lead to a
greater dependence on the cash economy (Pressman, 2015). This, combined with a disintegration of social networks as a result of patterns of labour migration, is claimed to boost delinquency rates (Thomson, 2016). As both cause and consequence, increasing social distance is crammed into decreasing physical space (Lynn, 2014). Labels such as ‘feral cities’ and ‘urban jungles’ have surfaced to describe sprawling conurbations in which the state’s control is limited and violent extremism becomes a means of survival (Norton, 2013; & Esser, 2014).

Urban spaces in regional conflict zones can create, host and perpetuate social systems and structures that induce violent behaviour (Esser, 2014), or which provide a natural home for insurgents or guerrillas (Kilcullen, 2013). For example, 8,000 Taliban fighters are now believed to operate in Karachi, the largest city in Asia where sectarian violence became commonplace in the 1990s and terrorist violence became a major problem after 9/11 (Kugelman, 2013). The migration of militant groups to Pakistan’s cities has been advanced as a contributing factor to violent extremism (Hinds, 2014). However, the literature on ‘youth bulges’ considers migration whether rural to urban or South to North to be a safety valve for youth discontent (Mahan, 2013).

In this view, if migration opportunities are increasingly restricted without domestic initiatives in place to provide opportunities for youth, developing countries that previously relied on exporting surplus youth may experience increased pressures from youth bulges accompanied by a higher risk of violent groups (Urdal, 2017). Others argue that rural isolation and fear can fuel ethnic tensions, while urban living can reduce tensions by forcing the admixture of different populations, offering opportunities for coexistence and empowerment in cities (Sommers, 2013). Some argue there is no correlation between urbanisation rates and levels of political violence; rather the significant predictor of urban riots is increasing urban inequality rather than urbanisation per se (Urdal, 2014), or experience of corruption (Shelley, 2015).

2.2.1 Marginalisation

According to Millar (2015), economic deprivation, political marginalisation or perceived marginalisation of ethnic or religious groups is believed to increase the risk
of violent extremism. For instance in Iraq, the failure to include Sunni Arabs in the post-2003 political settlement is frequently identified as a cause of the 2006-07 civil war and the later rise of Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL) (Tripp, 2013; Weiss and Hassan, 2015). There are certainly cases of extremist groups using economic deprivation or political exclusion as justification for violence. But, equally, violent extremist organisations can emerge and flourish in highly democratic countries as with left-wing extremist group in Germany in the 1970s, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) in the United Kingdom (UK), and Basque separatist group (ETA) in Spain (Rosand, 2013).

Some research distinguishes transnational from domestic terrorism, and source countries from target countries. The economic, social and political marginalisation of ethnic or religious groups is widely believed to increase the risk of violent extremism (Ohuoah, 2015). The perceived exclusion of Sunni Arabs from the post-2003 political settlement in Iraq, for example, is widely cited as a cause of the 2006-08 civil war and the later rise of ISIL (Tripp 2017; Weiss and Hassan, 2015). Similarly in Liberia, individuals felt that the war was necessary as Muslims needed to remind Christians that the country belonged to them (Alao & Jaye, 2013). According to a comprehensive study by the United Nations Development Programme (2016), deprivation and marginalization, underpinned by weak governance, are primary forces driving young Africans into violent extremism.

In conflicts involving violent extremism as opposed to terrorism directed against the West, economic deprivation and marginalisation do appear to explain why extremist groups are able to recruit support in large numbers (McCormick, 2015). For instance, Iraq is becoming a classic case of a conflict where persistent marginalisation of one community (the Sunni Arab minority) is pushing large numbers into violent extremism (Weiss & Hassan, 2015). Other cases in which substantial socio-economic grievances feature include northern Nigeria where the Hausa-speaking Muslim north has tended to experience political marginalisation and economic deprivation (McCaulley, 2015), Somalia where Al Shabaab has been especially successful at recruiting from minority clans (Sharif, 2016), and, in previous decades, Sri Lanka where the Tamil population endured decades of marginalisation (UN General Assembly Resolution, 2015). More generally, grievances such as political
marginalisation are often invoked in push-pull models of violent extremism (United States Agency for International Development, 2015; Zeuthen & Khalil, 2014).

In addition, Khalil (2014) contend that a governmental failure to provide basic services potentially creates a vacuum that extremist groups can fill to build support and legitimacy which might not otherwise have been forthcoming because of their violent tactics. Examples of violent groups which have built substantial support in this way include the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Hamas, Hezbollah, Jemaah Islamiya (Indonesia), the Gamaa Islamiyya (Egypt), and Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA). In Karachi, demand for water, electricity, transport, health and education services exceeds supply and government incapacity has left a void that private Islamist schools, clinics, hospitals and welfare agencies have filled (Richards, 2015).

Kessels (2014) argue that this phenomenon appears to be aligned with Islam, possibly as an effect of charity being one of Islam’s five pillars. However, these strategies are not exclusive to Islamist extremists, with the Nepalese Maoists and Uruguayan Tupamaros being prominent examples (Flanagan, 2014; Grynkewich, 2015; Magouirk, 2016). Grynkewich (2015) outlines three main benefits of this strategy for extremist groups. First, the creation of a social welfare infrastructure highlights the failure of the state to fulfil its side of the social contract, thereby challenging the state’s legitimacy. Second, non-state social welfare organizations offer the population an alternative entity in which to place their loyalty. Third, a group that gains the loyalty of the populace commands a steady stream of resources with which it can wage battle against the regime. These benefits are clear in the example of Hezbollah (Global Counter-Terrorism Forum, 2016), which operates on three planes: the civilian plane of da’wa (proselytization), social welfare, and religious education; the military resistance plane of jihad; and the political plane (Centre for Security Studies, 2015). In its drive to dominate Shi’a society, Hezbollah overcame its chief rival, Amal, and now plays a decisive role in Lebanon’s political system and the Middle East (Azani 2013).

Magouirk (2016) developed a mathematical model to demonstrate how terrorist and extremist groups utilise social service provision to gain support. It is based on a simple dichotomy of ‘resource’ groups, whose primary interest is retaining resources
and power for itself, and ‘social’ groups, which aim to improve the lot of the people. Berman (2014) considers Hamas, Hezbollah and the Taliban as ‘social’ groups, in that they genuinely want to help their members. While the focus has primarily been on the support and legitimacy gained by extremist groups, governments and existing state structures also lose credibility and support, as extremist groups attack the social contract between the state and the population, increasing the potential for state failure (Center on Global Counter-Terrorism Cooperation; & Hedayah, 2013)). These groups also often provide critical support for a population, which means directly targeting them would increase poverty and alienation and risk further radicalising the population (International Crisis Group, 2013).

Evidence from a wide range of countries shows that in situations of conflict and insecurity, populations often accept any entity that offers stability, at least in the short-term. Ganiel (2014) argues that ‘Religion is often a response to the failure of the state to deal with human security.’ Botha (2014) points to the example of Boko Haram, arguing that Boko arises in a situation where the Nigerian state has spectacularly failed to provide for the human security of the Nigerian population (Wolffe and Moorhead, 2015). Other prominent examples exist. ISIL enters areas afflicted by weak governance (Gelfand, 2015), an active war economy and ongoing conflict with the intention of changing this situation and imposing control (Blackwell, Stefano, Iacus, Gary, & Porro, 2015). This is done not for the benefit of the people but as a means to ensure longevity of its rule (Borum, 2014). ISIL seeks to impose itself as the only legitimate actor ensuring that, like a state, it has a monopoly on the use of force (Fink, 2015). Its reputation for governance, centred on security provision and delivery of basic services, is a recruiting tool not only for fighters but also for civilians to move to or remain in their areas.

According to Turkmani (2015), the local populations in areas under ISIL control fear the consequences of rebellion but see no urgent need, as they tend to be more secure under ISIL control. Support for ISIL demonstrates that basic services, security and governance are the primary concern of civilian populations which are impoverished and fear for their lives (Pandey, 2015). Ideologically, ISIL has not been widely or fully embraced but as an organisation with state-like operations it provides short-term relief from suffering in Syria and Iraq (Turkmani, 2015). Similarly, in Afghanistan,
the stability maintained under the Taliban explains the willingness of many sections of the population to accept their regime, drawing favourable comparisons between the Taliban era and the lawlessness, corruption and collapse of the justice system experienced during the civil war period and during the current era (Holmer, 2016). Even women are reported to have been willing to accept harsh Taliban justice and restriction in freedom and movement in exchange for improved physical security and a decrease in crime (Winterbotham, 2014). Religious and ethnic fault-lines do not always coincide, but the economic, social and political marginalisation of ethnic or religious groups is widely believed to increase the risk of violent extremism (Dawson, 2013).

2.2.2 Inequality

Unemployment is an aspect which might suggest inequality especially among the youthful population (African Union Security Council, 2014). Unemployment occurs when youth are not able to secure employment opportunities consistent with their levels of skill and education (Gary, 2013). It has been adduced as a factor in violent extremism following research in suggesting that a proportion of terrorists were relatively well educated but either unemployed or employed in fairly menial roles (Prewitt, 2016). Looking at Chechen militants, for instance, Speckhard and Ahkmedova (2016) found 88% unemployment even though 32% had experienced post-graduate or further education.

Similarly, studies focusing on Palestinian militants during the Second Intifada and Hizbollah in Lebanon reach similar conclusions (Collier, 2015). Even within the violent groups’ dataset, however, this is by no means consistent, there are plenty of examples of individuals who gave up a successful career, or combined it with violent extremism activity (Sageman, 2014). At the same time, while the relationship between education, employment and violent extremism in more popular and local militant groups needs further research, there is some limited evidence that militant groups recruit from the ranks of the unemployed (Abdalla, 2013).

Hassan’s (2014) small sample of Kenyan Al Shabaab recruits suggest that some were attracted by the wages offered, while Botha (2015) larger sample showed around half were unemployed: with unemployment levels among those aged 15-34 in Kenya at
70% and believed to be higher among Muslim youths, there is a healthy supply for the militant workforce (Miriti, Mugambi, and Ochieng, 2014). A different situation is evident in Iraq, where thousands of Baathists and military officers found themselves unemployed after the Coalition Provisional Authority’s decision to remove them from their jobs, creating not only a pool of unemployed potential militants but also a serious grievance (Bergenn, 2017). In Syria, ISIL’s wealth allows it to offer highly competitive salaries not just to fighters but other specialists required to run the proto-state.

At the same time, opposition-controlled areas are reported to have high levels of unemployment, ranging from 60% to 90%, which ‘together with very high prices and lack of other sources of income, has left men of fighting age, who typically have to provide for their families, in a very exposed position and vulnerable to recruitment by armed groups’(Turkmani, 2015). Lefree (2015) argues that deficits in security and justice and the existence of predatory and oppressive security sector institutions not only create grievances but also delegitimise the state, presenting opportunities for extremist groups to enhance their legitimacy. In Afghanistan, for example, the Taliban rose to power after the state collapsed, and then aligned with Al Qaida (Verhoeven, 2015). Similarly, current terrorist threats in Kenya and Uganda have been attributed to poverty among their populations, the failure to modernise security agencies, lack of investment in intelligence and policing capabilities and corruption in security forces (Muhammed 2014).

Hassan’s (2014) empirical but narrowly-based study of Al Shabaab based on just 50 interviews suggests that the main reasons these youth cite for joining Al Shabaab are not deeply held religious beliefs, but rather factors that revolve around their sense of identity and perceptions of neglect that stem from their frustration with lack of opportunities to improve the quality of their lives, clan politics, and other difficulties that come with war. A testament to this is the fact that most of them gave up violent extremism when given the chance of a better life, especially when trusted relatives were the ones presenting such opportunities (Busher, 2014).
2.2.3 Discrimination

Shapiro and Fair (2013) studied the relationship between poverty and support for violent extremism in Pakistan and found little evidence linking poverty, religiosity, support for Islamist politics and support for democratic values to support for militant nationalist and Islamist organizations. The findings suggest that public support for violent extremism varies across different extremist groups and specific political grievances are an important, but not decisive, driver of support. Blair (2015) conducted a 6,000 person nationally representative survey in Pakistan and concluded that poor individuals dislike militants more than middle-class Pakistanis. The dislike is strongest among urban poor, especially those living in neighbourhoods exposed to violent extremism.

Dowd and Lind (2015), in relation to sub-Saharan Africa, suggest that contemporary violence stems from historical grievances about the states’ failure over time to address deeply-rooted economic marginalisation and economic deprivation, while its use of repressive machinery to respond to insurgencies causes violent extremism to recur. Others, however, disagree. For instance, Freeman (2014) finds a more complex relationship between political discrimination and violence, Chenoweth (2015) finds that violent extremism activity is actually more prevalent in democracies, and Dalacoura’s (2016) analysis of Islamist extremist groups across the Middle East shows that economic and political exclusion and repression of Islamist movements contributed to the adoption of terrorist methods in some cases, but not in others.

Similarly, Borum (2014) and Horgan (2015) argue precisely that extremist groups are in most senses ‘normal’ but this very human need for identity combines with other basic needs and propensities in ways that increase the risk of ‘maladaptive’ behaviour. Borum (2014) provides a sophisticated psychological model of the terrorist ‘mindset’ and ‘worldview’ that combines vulnerabilities, such as the search for identity, with propensities (socially-learned preferences or traits). According to Windsor (2014), a young man in search of identity who has a strong propensity to sense grievance and external threat may be a much higher risk than one whose identity has formed and who lacks those propensities. The extremist organisation, then, can provide that sense of identity while meeting other needs.
Poor governance has long been assumed to be a driver for violent extremism (Philips, 2015). The underlying logic is that democratic institutions and procedures, by enabling the peaceful reconciliation of grievances and providing channels for participation in policymaking, can help to address those underlying conditions that have fuelled the recent rise of Islamist extremism (Windsor, 2013). In addition, Schmid (2006) argues that state weakness provides opportunities for revolt, while excessive strength and abuse of state power can foster resistance, providing opportunities for terrorist groups. World Bank (2016) proposes two reasons for this: when unpopular rulers cannot be voted away in democratic procedures, advocates of political violence find a wide audience; when long-standing injustices in society are not resolved, desperate people are willing to die and to kill for causes they and often also others perceive as just. Schmid’s thesis is intuitive, and some econometric studies such as Krueger and Laitin (2014) and Li (2015) show an inverse relationship between civil liberties and violent extremism.

One significant study conducted by Saucier (2015) takes a meta-analytical approach to the narratives set out in a wide range of extremist communications including from right-wing, apocalyptic and secular, nationalist-separatist groups and highlights their strong similarities, with common elements including messages of in-group identity, the need to address grievances, existential threat, the urgency of response, and the transformative potential of violence. The study suggests that the use of such simplified narratives to justify, recruit and motivate is near universal among extremist groups, but it tells nothing about the effects of extremist narrative on potential or recruited supporters.

United States Agency for International Development, (USAID) (2016) suggest that revenge for perceived humiliation is frequently offered as an explanation for acts of violence (Araj, 2013; Beg & Bokhari, 2014; Speckhard, 2015; Post, 2016), although retrospective justification does not necessarily reveal motivation or vulnerability. Also important is vicarious or ‘proxy’ humiliation, where group identity is sufficiently powerful to make individuals feel grievances without experiencing them directly (Silke, 2014; & Khosrokhavar, 2015). This phenomenon has been extensively examined in (Sunni) Islamist extremism, some expressions of which imagine the
global community of Muslims (the umma) to be under attack as a whole, and the same community to be bound by communal obligation to respond (Jansen, 2016).

Abadie (2015) suggest that states which are partly free, or are in transition from authoritarianism to democracy are particularly vulnerable to violent extremism. Newman (2013) argues that weak or failed states might provide an enabling environment for certain types of violent extremist groups to operate. However, according to Jason (2014), this is not a sufficient explanation as terrorist groups have also emerged from, and operated within countries which have strong, stable states and a variety of systems of government. Crenshaw (2014) suggested that many join terrorist groups as part of a search for meaning in their lives, while research drawn from mainstream psychology provided an increasingly strong theoretical basis for identity being an important factor (Turkmani, 2014).

Baumeister (2015), for instance, identified four specific needs which drives individuals’ search for meaning and identity such as sense of purpose, efficacy, value, and self-worth. Where identity is as yet unformed especially in adolescence or complex such as among second-generation immigrants it can become a significant source of vulnerability (Weiss, 2013). Causes which promote activism in the pursuit of high ideals, the reformation of society, or correcting grave injustices are potentially powerful solutions to these primal needs (Tangen, 2014). For instance, Venhaus (2010) concluded his study of over 2,000 foreign fighters in Al Qaida-linked movements with the observation that ‘they all were looking for something: they want to understand who they are, why they matter, and what their role in the world should be. They have an unfulfilled need to define themselves, which al-Qaida offers to fill’.

Uzodike (2015), states that in radical movements and extremist groups, many prospective terrorists find not only a sense of meaning, but also a sense of belonging, connectedness and affiliation. This is why radicalisation itself is often regarded as a ‘social process’, not just an ideological one (Stern, 2014). How the individual and the organisation then come together is an explicit focus of the social movement theory approach to violent extremism (Gentry, 2015). The best instance of this is Wikotorowicz’s (2015) research into the now-proscribed British extremist group Al Muhajiroun, based on detailed empirical research from which Wikotorowicz developed a model in which the individual, seeking a cause, presents a ‘cognitive
opening’, while the group is active in promoting itself as an answer to societal aspirations or problems. According to Sambanis (2015), the two will come together if there is ‘frame alignment such as a match between the cognitive opening and the worldview offered by the group. The power of Wikotorowicz’s model, and social movement theory more generally, lies in its wide applicability: it provides a potential explanation for why individuals join counter-cultural or radical groups in general, not just terrorist or violent extremist groups.

2.4 Link Between Poverty and Violent Extremism

According to Waldmann (2013), poverty and deprivation have been dismissed as drivers of Western-focused transnational terrorism. However, there is a correlation between poverty and civil war (Magouirk, 2015), and hence some broader-based forms of violent extremism (Zeuthen, 2016). Because poverty may be a side-effect of some other cause, it is not possible to isolate it as a cause of violent extremism (Khalil, 2015). The relationship between poverty/deprivation and terrorism/violent extremism/radicalisation has been extensively explored and the results are interestingly mixed (Jitka, 2014). Studies which restrict themselves to terrorism as opposed to broader-based violent movements tend to conclude definitively that terrorists are not poor, deprived or even relatively deprived (Dalgaard & Nielsen, 2014). As Krueger and Laitin (2016) put it in a summary of the literature to date, ‘studies at the individual level of analysis have failed to find any direct connection between education, poverty, and the propensity to participate in terrorism, If anything, those who participate in terrorism tend to come from the ranks of the better off in society’ (Vaux, 2015).

Krueger and Laitin (2016) conclude from an econometric analysis that economics explains the target, not the origin, of transnational terrorism. Horgan (2015) suggest that the national origins of terrorism are in countries that suffer from political oppression; the targets are countries that enjoy a measure of economic success’ (Ginning, 2014). Malečková (2015) acknowledge that, on a simple view, poor countries produce more violent groups, but insist that GDP per capita becomes unrelated to number of extremist groups when controlling for other factors, such as the extent of civil liberties. However, studies such as Abadie (2014) tend to focus again on terrorists attacking the West and its allies; Laitin (2014) on Israel/Palestine,
where attacks against Israel were negatively correlated with the performance of the Palestinian economy, ignoring more popular and local violent extremist movements.

An opinion poll data by Blair, Fair and Malhotra (2014) in Pakistan suggests that support for militancy is higher among middle-class respondents than lower-class one. In addition, in Central Asia, there is evidence that Islamic extremists have been drawn from the relatively well-off and educated urban populations as well as from among the poorer segments of the Central Asian societies (Omelicheva, 2015). Within developing countries, however, Bird, Bloomberg and Hess (2014) find that terrorism is inversely proportionate to income, while Burgoon (2016) finds an inverse relationship between welfare spending as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Looking beyond transnational terrorism targeting the West, a different picture emerges. There is a strong negative correlation between per capita income and civil war: ‘The mean per capita GDP in countries affected by at least one civil war from 1960 to 1999 is less than half that of countries with no civil war and countries with no wars grow much faster than war-affected countries’ (Sambanis, 2014).

Fearon and Laitin (2013) identify poverty and the state weakness that tends to accompany it as one of the most salient conditions for the onset of violent extremism. More importantly, violent extremist groups operating in war-afflicted countries are frequently but probably not consistently representing economically deprived minorities (Hassan, 2014). The emergence of Islamist violent extremism in Kenya both locally recruited Al-Shabaab fighters and the indigenous movement Al Muhajiroun is consistent with the economic situation of Kenya’s Muslims in general and the Muslim majority at Coast and North-East provinces (Gurr, 2016). Similarly, Boko Haram’s strongholds of Borno and Kano are Nigeria’s most deprived regions (Uzodike and Maiangwa, 2016). In Pakistan, the socio-economic profile of militants seems to vary according to violent extremist group (Emler, 2013).

For instance while the Pakistani Taliban recruit largely from poor, illiterate communities, Lashkar Tayyaba’s recruit are in general more highly educated and often come from middle class backgrounds (Cronin, 2013). This suggests that poverty may in fact be a factor in extremist violence but only of certain types, such as where violent extremism arises in a civil war situation, or in low-income but highly unequal countries (Nielsen, 2015). Poverty is a blight, and one that disproportionately affects...
sub-Saharan Africa (Mwambora, 2015). It is a vast and complex issue whose tentacles reach into many areas, including climate change, sustainable development and crucially global security.

The link between poverty and violent extremism is compelling, and means that if a nation want to address extremism, it must fight inequality too (Burgoon, 2014). Although personal poverty is not a reason for joining violent extremism, the cases of these youth show that the effects of poverty, such as idleness and low self-esteem, cannot be ignored (Dalacoura, 2014). The fact that many Somali youth are unemployed and rely on relatives for sustenance, either in Somalia or in the diaspora, dampens their self-worth such that when an opportunity to fend for oneself arises, they are quick to take advantage. Poverty has more of a role in terrorism than experts believe (Carter, 2014). A study done by confirms, that poor people, despite level of education, are easily radicalized and conscripted into violent religious extremism. According to Marx (2011), religion is an opiate of the poor (Crenshaw, 2015). That perspective converges with findings that poverty attracts religious believes, and that radical ascription to religious ideologies provides cohorts with a sense of self-worth besides hope that religion gives poor people hope. More educated youths joined violent religious extremist organizations between 2010 and 2016 and early 2017 (Comolli, 2013). They were motivated by the promise of money which then provides them a sense of self-worth or purpose in life whereby poverty is best viewed from an employment and economic activities lens (Abadie, 2015). Today, more and more youths are graduating from university colleges but cannot secure employment or funding to engage in economic activities and this makes them vulnerable (Taylor, 2014). According to Allison (2014), poverty is the root cause of disenfranchisement of millions of people, thus, can be referred to as a catalyst.

Karnovsky (2013) found out that, to achieve their objectives (radicalizing and conscripting poor people), extremist groups, exploit socio-politics and economics of impoverished regions to influence and subsequently build a religious perception. How? They fuse economics with religion to malign political establishments in the target area (Atrani, 2014). This is a form outbidding. Religion is used to build ideologies that more often are anti-(government and political) establishment. The common approaches include blaming the political establishment for the poor
economic state such as misconstruing authority as repression and occupation (Briggs, 2013).

Upon ideologically outbidding political authority in such areas, terrorists conscript select youths into violent extremism and begins to orchestrate premeditated, religious-politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatants to influence the political establishment and its supporters (the audience of terrorist’s activities) (Chenoweth, 2015). Africa bears the brunt of lives lost, economies ruined, and relationships fractured by terrorism (Hayward, 2014). It is the continent where al-Qaeda launched its war against the United States in 1998, by bombing the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania; where Boko Haram kidnapped 276 Nigerian schoolgirls in 2014; and where 147 students were killed in their sleep at Kenya’s Garissa University in 2015.

While these attacks did garner the world’s attention, most people do not realize that, in the past five years alone, 33,000 people have died in terrorism-related violence in Africa. Violent extremism and groups espousing it are threatening to reverse Africa’s development gains not only in the near term, but also for decades to come (Rifkind, 2014). African countries are particularly vulnerable to violent ideologues, owing to the prevalence of weak institutions and ungoverned territory where extremist groups can germinate (Frazer, 2015). Add to this the mismanagement of ethnic and religious diversity, stir in a large and growing cohort of unemployed and digitally connected youth, and the continent offers ideal conditions for mayhem (Erez, 2015).

Emulating countries elsewhere, African governments have responded to violent extremism primarily by putting “hard” security first (Thumbya, 2013). But this strategy has not reduced extremist groups’ potency or limited their reach (Berman, 2014). In fact, there is evidence that an exclusively military response can be a waste of resources, or even do more harm than good (Muinde, 2014). What is missing is a deeper examination of root causes, particularly underlying development challenges (Carter, 2014). Some people claim that the connection between socioeconomic conditions and violent extremism is specious, because most poor and marginalized communities do not join terrorist groups (Baker, 2013). But this argument fails to address the relevant issue: poverty, social marginalization, and political disenfranchisement are the fertilizers extremist groups need to take root and grow.
(Feve, 2016). Around the world, policies and operational responses to violent extremism are largely informed by theory, rather than drawing on thorough empirical evidence of the personal motivations and structural factors that drive people to commit terrorist acts (Gelles, 2014).

2.5 Chapter Summary

This study sought to add to the existing knowledge gap of the influence of Poverty on Violent Extremism in Kenya: a case of Mombasa County. The research established that governmental failure to provide basic services potentially creates a vacuum that extremist groups can fill to build support and legitimacy which might not otherwise have been forthcoming because of their violent tactics. Different studies have examined the relationship between poverty and violent extremism in different contexts. Some have shown that the economic, social and political marginalisation of ethnic or religious groups is widely believed to increase the risk of violent extremism (Ohuoah, 2015). Others like Huntingdon (2013); Pipes 2014); & Lewis, (2015) have argued that the prevalence and persistence of violent extremism in Muslim-majority countries has prompted some commentators to propose that Islam itself promotes violent extremism. The following chapter (chapter three) discussed the technic and procedure to be undertaken for the primary study.
CHAPTER THREE

3.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter has various sections addressed showing the methodology applied to undertake this particular study with the goal of answering the key specific objectives of the study. The first section presents the research design. Next, the population and sample is discussed. Data collection techniques and analysis are presented in the next section. The analytical tool used in the analyses is also presented. Finally, the validity of the data used and ethical issues in conducting the research are discussed as well.

3.2 Research Design

This investigation utilized descriptive research design incorporating panel data for ten years, between 2007 and 2017. Kenya has experienced enormous challenges in fight against violent extremists like the Al-Shabaab in the last 10 years. During this period, thousands of youth from the coast have been radicalized to join violent extremism in and outside Kenya (Ministry of Interior, 2015). This therefore is the best time for the current topic. Descriptive research is used to depict the current circumstance, what individuals at present accept, what individuals are doing right now et cetera (Collins, Onwuegbuzi and Jiao, 2007). The real reason for descriptive research is portrayal of the situation as it exists at present (Kothari, 2004). This was the motivation in selecting descriptive design in order to describe the current situation in terms of Poverty and Violent Extremism in Mombasa County.

3.3 Sampling

3.3.1 Sampling Design and Sample Size

The study employed non-probability sampling technique using experts and snowball technique.

3.4 Data Collection Methods

The study used secondary data and this was due to availability of sufficient secondary sources of information Panel data for a period of ten years (2007-2017) was gathered
from publications dependent on information from the County government reports, Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, World Values Surveys, UN records, national government records, non-benefit associations (NGOs) records, media articles, and concentrates identified with the present subject.

3.5 Research Procedures

To ensure validity of secondary data, the present study ensured that the sources are reputable and the information is not more than 15 years old. Validity of information is the degree to which a test measures what it should quantify (Bozlu, 2013). The study also ensured that the information relates to the problem or hypothesis being investigated. To establish content and construct validity the researcher sought expert opinion concerning the research instruments from the supervisor at United States International University (USIU).

3.6 Data Analysis Methods

Data analysis is the process of evaluating data using analytical and logical reasoning to examine each component of the data provided (Dorant, 2015). Data was analysed using content analysis as well as principle component analysis to determine the main causes of poverty and VE in Mombasa County.

3.7 Ethical Standards

Ethics are the norms and behaviours that are allowed in a society or among group objectives (Kothari, 2010). Therefore, ethical considerations was pertinent to this study because of the methods of data collection. Acknowledgement of authors whose information and ideas were borrowed was observed. To avoid plagiarism, the study paraphrased all information obtained from secondary sources and acknowledged all data accordingly.

3.8 Chapter Summary

Chapter three secured the strategies utilized to complete this investigation. Using panel data gathered from World Values Surveys, UN records, National government records, and non-benefit associations (NGOs) records in Mombasa County. The examination applied descriptive research design in order to answer the following
research questions: what are the predominant causes of violent extremism in Mombasa County?; what is the extent of poverty prevalence on violent extremism in Mombasa County?; and what is the link between poverty and violent extremism in Mombasa County?. Data was analysed content analysis as well as principle component analysis to determine the main causes of poverty and VE in Mombasa County.

The accompanying chapter (chapter four) presents the secondary findings and discuss the literature review in association with the findings. Presentation of the findings has been discussed starting with descriptive, then the inferential while interpreting the findings by comparing and contrasting.
CHAPTER FOUR

4.0 ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses research findings of the study which was aimed to examine the influence of Poverty on Violent Extremism in Kenya: a case of Mombasa County. The chapter presents the analysis of the findings guided by meta-analysis of secondary data. The analyses was divided into the following sections: - first section analysed the predominant causes of poverty in Mombasa County; the second section discussed the extent of poverty prevalence on violent extremism in Mombasa County while the third section investigated the link between poverty and violent extremism in Mombasa County.

4.2 The Predominant Causes of Poverty in Mombasa County.

4.2.1 Unemployment

Mombasa is a small metropolitan county on Kenya’s coast and the second largest city after Nairobi (Zelezer, 2013). It is the site of an important regional port, boasts magnificent coral beaches and important historical sites and as such is a hub for local and international tourism. Its main economic sectors include tourism, industry, transport, water sports and fishing. It is highly populated with an estimated 1.2 million people in 230 km sq. Geographically the county is interesting being divided by 2 creeks, Port Reitz and Port Tudor, creating an island upon which the old town is located amongst other developments (Tiyambe, 2014). Historically Mombasa has been a vibrant trading center for glass, brass, copper, iron and rhino horn, with established trade routes to China, Persia, and India (Ailsa, 2013). Mombasa’s history, culture and challenges tend to reflect those of the entire former Coast province, including Lamu, Kilifi and Kwale Counties. Cross-cutting drivers of crime and violence mentioned repeatedly in these areas include historical marginalization of the Coast, land issues, namely the lack of secure land tenure for indigenous coastal peoples, cultural and religious tensions, low standards of education and family breakdown (Gona, 2015).
The results of the analysis indicate that poverty rates in Mombasa are said to be around 38% according to Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (2015) and unemployment was estimated at 15% in 2009, although this figure is likely not to represent those in informal non-salaried employment. The analysis shows that there is high labor migration from the rural areas amongst working age population aged between 15-64 years, but also many noncoastal people (Karongo, 2014). The narrative of wabara (up-country people) and wapwani (coastal people) was common in the discussion on employment as key state jobs were skewed against the locals, and outsiders are often given the skilled or semi-skilled employment opportunities (Nthiga, 2013). The most common salaried industries include family businesses, port, transport and tourism.

The County Integrated Development Plan (CIDP, 2014) mentions landlessness, high cost of living, lack of skills/education/training, lack of access to credit, HIV/AIDS, gender discrimination, poor resource management among others as key causes of poverty in Mombasa. The tourist industry has been particularly hard hit by insecurity at the coast and travel advisories to avoid Kenya (Alvazzi, 2013). The results of the analysis noted that People have been losing jobs and people are hungry. There is a lot of joblessness and hence insecurity (Lauren, 2015). Further, large unplanned settlements exist in the city and are growing; here living conditions are poor and vulnerabilities to crime and violence are high; these include Kisauni, Bangladesh, Magogo, Likoni, Longo and Bamburi (Sharkey, 2015). The empirical evidence has noted that the relationship between poverty and crime and violence is complex and is not directly causal (Sharkey, 2015).

Importantly, the existing literature review has shown that the most useful analysis is not at the level of the characteristics of the person, but rather the context in which they live; poor environments increase the opportunities for crime and violence, and also fail to protect young people from undesirable influences (Sharamo, 2014). This may happen due to overcrowding or low state presence which becomes replaced by other providers of services and security such as radicalization (Opiyo, 2015). As the analysis notes, however, crime by wealthy people may be underrepresented and under-researched because it is usually behind closed doors, rather than on the streets (Sanga, 2014). The relationship between unemployment and VE is more direct and
may result from the need to provide for the family, as well as depriving people of social bonds which might have prevented them from committing crimes (Mwahanga, 2014). The analysis notes that there are links between poverty and radicalization narratives which highlight marginalization and also a direct link to recruitment due to offers of money which meet livelihood needs (Scheffran, 2013).

4.2.2 Lack of Education

The coastal area has suffered from marginalization in education, historically partly because “Christian” education, often led by missionaries, was not acceptable to the largely Muslim population (Ruteere, 2013). Currently there remains low investment, low quality, poor recruitment and high rates of school drop-out due to poverty and cultural differences (Rugene, 2013). The Mombasa First County Integrated Development Plan (2013) notes that literacy levels are around 86.3%. Enrolment at primary and secondary school is 81.1% and 32.5% respectively. Schools are said to be under resourced in terms of infrastructure. The Plan lists four youth polytechnics in the county, a technical training institute, a teacher-training college, one public university: The Technical University of Mombasa, four satellite campuses of public universities, and three satellite campuses of private universities.

Table 4.1: Overall Employment by Education Levels in Mombasa County

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Level</th>
<th>work for pay</th>
<th>Family Agricultural Holding</th>
<th>Intern/Volunteer</th>
<th>family business</th>
<th>Family Agricultural Holding</th>
<th>Retired/Homemaker</th>
<th>Fulltime Student</th>
<th>Incapacitated</th>
<th>Number of Individuals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>598,021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>56,308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>239,944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>301,769</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The analysis has established that a total of 37% of Mombasa County residents have secondary level of education or above. Mvita constituency has the highest share of residents with secondary level of education or above at 43%. This is 11 percentage points above Likoni constituency, which has the lowest share of residents with secondary level of education or above. Mvita constituency is 6 percentage points above the county average. Changamwe ward has the highest share of residents with a
secondary level of education or above at 56% (Osamba, 2014). This is eight times Mwakirunge ward, which has the lowest share of residents with a secondary level of education or above (Onsarigo, 2016). Changamwe is 19 percentage points above the county average. A total of 46% of Mombasa County residents have a primary level of education only (Norris, 2013).

Further, the results of the analysis indicate that Likoni constituency has the highest share of residents with a primary level of education only at 50% (Ombati, 2014). This is 11 percentage points above Mvita constituency, which has the lowest share of residents with a primary level of education only (Abdi, 2014). Likoni constituency is 4 percentage points above the county average. Shika Adabu ward has the highest share of residents with a primary level of education only at 54%. This is 21 percentage points above Changamwe ward, which has the lowest share of residents with a primary level of education only. Shika Adabu ward is 8 percentage points above the county average (Ngige, 2013).

The study has noted that some 17% of Mombasa County residents have no formal education (Nyangena, 2014). Kisauni constituency has the highest share of residents with no formal education at 19%. This is 6 percentage points above Changamwe constituency, which has the lowest share of residents with no formal education. Kisauni constituency is 2 percentage points above the county average. Mwakirunge ward has the highest percentage of residents with no formal education at 42%. This is almost four times Changamwe ward, which has the lowest percentage of residents with no formal education. Mwakirunge is 25 percentage points above the county average (Hijra, 2014).

**Figure 4.1 Perceived Causes of Violent Extremism in Mombasa County.**
The results of the Meta analysis indicate that poverty (32%) (Figure 4.1) was the main factor contributing to violent extremism.

### 4.2.3 Income Inequality

According to the world inequality statistics (2015), Kenya is ranked 103 out of 169 countries making it the 66th most unequal country in the world. Kenya’s Inequality is rooted in its history, politics, economics and social organization and manifests itself in the lack of access to services, resources, power, voice and agency (Ombati, 2014). Inequality continues to be driven by various factors such as: social norms, behaviours and practices that fuel discrimination and obstruct access at the local level and/or at the larger societal level; the fact that services are not reaching those who are most in need of them due to intentional or unintentional barriers (Nzioki, 2015); the governance, accountability, policy or legislative issues that do not favor equal opportunities for the disadvantaged (Mutiso, 2013); and economic forces i.e. the unequal control of productive assets by the different socio-economic groups (Kokonya, 2014).

The results of the analysis show that, sustained poverty reduction cannot be achieved unless equality of opportunity and access to basic services is ensured (World Social Situation, 2014). Reducing inequality must therefore be explicitly incorporated in policies and programmes aimed at poverty reduction. In addition, specific
interventions may be required, such as: affirmative action; targeted public investments in underserved areas and sectors; access to resources that are not conditional; and a conscious effort to ensure that policies and programmes implemented have to provide equitable opportunities for all (Ndulo, 2016).

The dry poverty statistics in Kenya sum it all up. The results of the analysis indicate that somewhere between one quarter and half of the population earn less than $1 US each day (the annual GDP per capita is around $360 US) (Malow, 2014). It was estimated in 2010 that half of all rural Kenyans were living below the poverty line. That represents approximately 9 million people. The situation is not quite as bad in the urban centers, where such poverty only effects a third of the population (Nassef, 2013).

The analysis has shown that weak overall infrastructure for the country means that nearly all the rural population are forced to rely on their own subsistence farming for their own food as well as monetary income (Hesse, 2014). Jobs are scarce, leaving people with little opportunity for employment. There are considerable obstacles for starting a small business in Kenya as well (Mwakio, 2014). Micro credits may be one way to foster small entrepreneurs. They will be important when eradicating poverty in Kenya. According to Transparency International, Kenya is one of the most corrupt nations in the world. It is difficult for the majority of the population to escape the poverty in Kenya, when government money is used improperly (Muturi, 2014). Bribes, fraud and tribal favoritism are common within the all levels of government, which hampers any attempt to improve conditions across the country. In the early 2000s, the Kenyan government began taking steps to reduce the rampant corruption (Limiri, 2013). These reforms have inspired some confidence, and brought additional foreign investment back to Kenya, but at the core of the system corruption remains.

4.3 The Extent of Poverty Prevalence on Violent Extremism in Mombasa County.

According to the results of the analysis, radicalization and recruitment into violent extremism is the foremost security threat in Mombasa (Malemba, 2014). For youths in Mombasa the main concern is the high numbers who are being recruited to join Al Shabaab for training or combat in Somalia (Lutta, 2013). Kenya Muslim Youth Alliance (2016) note that the majority of Kenya youths who have joined Al Shabaab
have come from coastal counties of Kilifi, Mombasa and Kwale. While some may have been disillusioned with Al Shabaab, and perhaps with its ideals, others may be involved in forming bases within Kenya.

According to this analysis, clerics in Mombasa have argued for each four to five houses there is a radicalization problem. The analysis relates this to the story of a Form 4 boy (aged 16) whose parents observed him coming in late and then behaving strangely (Kumssa, 2014). Shortly afterwards he disappeared and the parents received a brief call from him saying “Where I am, I am safe, do not worry.” They could not call back (Leggesse, 2013). The scenario is said to be a common one, as the results of the analysis noted that there are so many disappearances of youth in Mombasa County. Although juveniles are among those radicalized, according to the peace committee, most commonly the youths are older than those involved in juvenile violence (Jebet, 2014).

According to the analysis, in 2014 Musa Mosque in Mombasa became associated with recruitment and radical preaching by Sheikh Abubakar Shariff (aka Makaburi) who was killed after police linked him to a massacre on a church in March 2014 (Kiplagat, 2014). The mosque was stormed by police in February of that year, and 5 community members and one police officer died in the confrontation (Lekapana, 2016). For a time, it was renamed Masjid Shuhadaa (Martyr’s Mosque). At the time a local Sheikh recounted the speeches being given in such mosques by recruiters, “I cannot see a man here, if you are a man, put up your hand.” This they would follow with promises of money. Some youth are given a gun and offered a monthly salary of 50,000 KShs (approx. $500 US) for joining up before even being asked to fight (although several stories are given of this money not coming through(Mamo, 2015).

In terms of enabling factors, in Majengo that there has been division between youths and Sheikhs in the mosques, with specific disagreements over the salary of Sheikhs and the distribution of food in the Mosque (Peden, 2014). The analysis has identified that no one addressed them, and this continued and the youths decided to take advantage. It started slowly by slowly and no one did anything. The analysis noted that the youths were noted to have taken over some mosques and appointed their own leaders (Lampaa, 2013). This division has been one of the enabling factors in
radicalization. Indirectly, the exposure to violence from a young age, as previously described, may reduce resistance to new forms of violence (Khan, 2015).

Further the analysis has found that drug addiction in Mombasa County was a push factor for radicalization since monetary incentives were offered. Sometimes job offers are made which turn out to be recruitment for training in violent extremism. In terms of the context and targets of radicalization, it was noted that while mosques and madrassas had been sites of radicalization, this was shifting into online radicalization through social media platforms (Haskell, 2015). Recruiters were said to be targeting youths mainly aged 15-23, and that this was increasingly including girls (Baraka, 2014). Vulnerable individuals included both manual workers and wealthier people such as high school students, and graduate professionals. The analysis has noted that high school teachers, madrassa tutors or even Sunday school teachers were among the recruiters (Akwiri, 2013).

According to this analysis, a new challenge for Mombasa is the return of undocumented numbers of youths from Somalia (Kinoti, 2013). Some of them have deserted due to lack of promised remuneration, while others remain allied to the objectives of Al Shabaab and may even be part of internal terror cells with a specific mission or strategy (Maore, 2014). Some were said to be given missions to execute, under the command of cells who act anonymously. Many of these are in hiding, facing threats all round from state security and Al Shabaab sympathizers, as well as rejection by their own communities who fear and mistrust them (Subedi, 2013). The empirical evidence shows that amnesty for these people has been promised on occasion but is far from certain. A 10-day amnesty was announced in April 2016 to allow returnees to come forward for de-radicalization, rehabilitation and monitoring programs.

However the official position on returnees has been confusing, inconsistent and lacking in policy (Ramraj, 2014). In May 2016, the then Mombasa Senator urged the government to clarify again its position on amnesty since youths were not assured of their safety (Ogada, 2013). In neighboring Kwale locals told of returned youths who had been deliberately targeted and killed by police. As the analysis noted however, targeted killings may be even more complicated and sinister, “Some, the
recruiters/agents will finish them. It’s a big syndicate, the security are aware. The disappearances are not clear (Nyanjom, 2015).

From the results of this analysis, Mombasa saw 17 attacks likely to be carried out by violent extremists, in which 31 people died (including police and occasionally the extremists themselves (Agade, 2016). Police launched 20 counter-terror operations against terror suspects, killing 29. Some of the suspects were unarmed at the time. Three radical clerics among them Sheikh Aboud Rogo, Sheikh Ibrahim Omar and Sheikh Abubakar Shariff also known as Makaburi, and two moderate clerics: Sheikh Salim Bakari Mwarangi and Sheikh Mohammed Idris were noted to have been killed over that time (Mogire, 2015). However, IRIN, humanitarian news and analysis from around the world lists several more clerics and others killed by both police and by radical youths from mid-2011 to 2014.

The results of the analysis show that some of the terror incidents included the church shooting in Likoni in March 2014 and several grenade attacks, as well as the failed attack on Mombasa central police station by three women in September 2016 in which all three were shot dead. They were said to have been aligned with the slain radical cleric Sheikh Aboud Rogo (Muigua, 2014). It is also worth noting that several of the terror incidents were revenge attacks following police operations and killings. In the analysis, a senior police officer stated that anti-terrorism security measures are high in Mombasa ‘All churches are armed, weddings are armed, malls are armed and public functions are all protected (Boru, 2015).” Sea and road links are also guarded and many illegal immigrants have been deported.

Empirical evidence has argued that religious tensions in Mombasa are closely related to the marginalization of indigenous peoples who mostly identify as Muslim, and their resentment of outsiders whom they see as having taken land and opportunities (Sodipo, 2014). However, relations have been fairly peaceable until recent years with the rise of terrorism and Kenya’s role in global anti-terrorism activities, allied to the USA. In addition, the analysis has noted that an important local issue in religious tension is counter-terrorism operations by the state and the police as noted above, in which they are accused of profiling of Muslims, and of committing human-rights offences including extra-judicial killings of Muslim clerics (Mutahi, 2014).
As noted by the analysis, clerics involved in interfaith activities have also been targets of radical killings, illustrating the determination by some not to have unity, and deterring others from being part of this important peace-making role. The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED, 2015) lists 3 prominent extremist clerics and 2 moderates who have been killed but Haki Africa list 8 clerics of whom 4 are described as having openly extremist teachings, and several others who have been summarily killed by unknown assailants.

The empirical evidence show that several of the terrorist and counter-terrorist incidences noted above were carried out on places of worship which has taken the issue beyond a few individuals to affect whole religious communities. As noted by the analysis, you only need to attack one mosque and it will appear like it’s a religious conflict (Maszka, 2015). Indeed, radical narratives often make use of attacks on Muslims to say that Islam is under threat (Nyheim, 2016). For instance, according to the existing literature review, when the police stormed Musa Mosque in February 2014, worshippers were upset that this had been done during Friday prayers, and that police had walked through the mosque with their shoes (Roach, 2015). Church attacks include the shooting in Joy Jesus Church, Likoni in March 2014 in which 6 died and 19 others were injured, an earlier grenade attack on the Earthquake Miracle Ministries church in Likoni in June 2013 in which 12 were injured, and the burning of the Salvation Army church, Majengo in October 2013 which was a revenge for the killing of Sheikh Omar (Hitchen, 2013).

In addition, the analysis noted that several extremist gangs operate in Mombasa. In December 2016, the Ministry of the Interior banned and named extremist gangs in Kenya; among them were a number based in the coastal area (Ethan, 2015). The analysis has noted that the violent gangs are a major problem in Mombasa because they are easily radicalized and become violent extremists (Desai, 2015). The analysis cited the case of a new ward and settlement called Timbwani which has a population of around 60,000, but also has 55 gangs and is considered to be criminal hideout (Kapusta, 2014). In a crime mapping report by National Crime Research Centre in 2016, the following 23 gangs were identified: Al Shabaab, Mombasa Republican Council, Bagdad Boys, Wakali Kwanza/Wakali Wao/Wakali Kabisa, Funga File, Waiyo, Wasafi, Mawayu, Kumi Bila, Boko Haram-Shoda, 40 Brothers, KK,
From the analysis, the terminology of gangs may be used to describe a wide spectrum of activity, from simple gatherings of young people, to groups engaging in low level criminal activities such as use of soft drugs or low-level territorial conflicts or petty crimes, and then at the extreme, to extremist groups involved in full-blown organized crime or violent extremism (Felson, 2015). Various factors leading to VE in Mombasa County have been identified among them: unemployment. The analysis has noted that there is pressure to get money to buy drugs (Daballen, 2014). In the absence of money they kill. Empirical evidence suggest that some of the extremist groups did not usually have any political aims, although others noted that they were linked to politicians and even the security officers.

4.4 The Link between Poverty and Violent Extremism in Mombasa County.

Poverty is a blight, and one that disproportionately affects sub-Saharan Africa (Opondo, 2014). It is a vast and complex issue whose tentacles reach into many areas, including climate change, sustainable development and crucially global security (Gathura, 2014). The link between poverty and violent extremism is compelling, and means that if we want to address extremism, we must fight inequality too (Adano, 2015). Former or in occasional cases current–voluntary recruits to extremist organizations such as Al Shabaab, Boko Haram or Ansar Dine were analysed in this study. The results of the analysis showed that poverty, lack of employment, healthcare, education, security and housing as reasons for joining the extremist groups, with very few mentioning religious ideology (Mwenje, 2015).

Kenya as in many other countries, the regions acknowledged to be flashpoints for radicalisation and violent extremism are synonymous with extreme poverty, high illiteracy levels and under-investment in basic services (Benyawa, 2014). The majority of those living in these regions have for years believed themselves to be excluded from the national development agenda. The analysis drive home the reality that a focus on security-led responses to extremism cannot provide lasting solutions, but rather that confronting the challenges of radicalism and terrorist threats, particularly in Mombasa, calls for action on a range of social, cultural, economic and political fronts (Anneli, 2014).
The results of the analysis has noted that the issue of land ownership in the coastal region of Kenya is cited as one of the contributors of poverty and hence violent extremism (Cox, 2015). Land grievances reflecting the marginalization of the coastal region are a product of policies embraced by the succession of post-independence government policies. The issue of land has played a core role in social movements in the coast, such as the Mombasa Republican Council and extremist groups like Kaya Bombo in Kwale, and was cited in the Al Shabaab statement justifying the raids on upcountry settlers in Lamu (Krug, 2014). Implementing the land reforms mandated by the new constitution and the issuance of title deeds demand immediate attention to address such long standing issues (Haskell, 2013).

The analysis noted that extremism caused nearly 33,000 deaths in Africa between 2011 and 2016, with related displacement and economic devastation causing some of the worst humanitarian disasters on the continent. Numerous studies show that increasing inequality hinders economic growth and undermines social cohesion, increases political and social tensions and drives instability and conflict (Tumbo, 2016). The analysis has established that poor governance and corruption is responsible for the lack of trust in the government, generating disillusionment in many coastal communities (Omwami, 2013). Devolution under the 2010 Constitution was to provide answers to the existing governance deficit (Nyanjom, 2014; & Bosire, 2013).

According to the analysis, the system of county governments has, however, fostered elite communities where employment opportunities are still based on patronage and development rarely trickles down to the marginalized households (Carranza, 2015). Al-Shabaab and other extremist groups recruiters prey on disillusioned members of communities such as youth who are frustrated by the Kenya’s political elite’s culture of impunity (Akwiri, 2015). Civil society actors should therefore play an active role with other stakeholders such as traditional elders and religious leaders to improve monitoring of new developments contributing to the region’s marginalization (Benyawa, 2013).

Despite the success of security sector hard responses in temporarily quelling violent extremism, the indiscriminate execution of these actions exerts unintended impacts due to the radicalizing impact on innocent individuals and at-risk youth. They can also
radicalize sympathetic groups or produce new offshoots of extremist groups (Berg, 2013). Kenya’s security sector must reassess its counterterrorism strategy’s consequences for marginalized groups, particularly Somali Muslims and coastal Muslims (Badurdeen, 2017). This is vital for community policing efforts that require continuous engagement with local communities. Community trust depends on the credibility of the security sector in respect to thorough and timely investigations into allegations of arbitrary detention, raids, arrests, extrajudicial killings and use of torture by the security forces (Ayiera, 2015).

According to this analysis, states become part of the problem in nurturing violent extremism when institutions fail to implement laws, lack the capacity to effectively prosecute crimes related to violent extremism, or when they go beyond the existing laws or resort to non-conventional ways for dealing with violent extremism (Sodipo, 2013). These problems feed the collective grievances narrative of indigenous coastal communities and provide the justification, extremists exploit through narratives focusing on the unfair treatment by the government and law enforcement officers. Such problematic state responses towards extremism are based on the tendency to over-react, resulting in vulnerable populations feeling they are the target of politically motivated and religiously biased security practices and unjust judicial systems (UNDP, 2016).

From the meta-analysis of various research documents on Violent extremism in the coastal region can be attributed to many factors including the effects of unchecked religious teachings and practices as continuous indoctrination in places of worship, aimed at radicalizing Muslim youths (Clarke, 2014). In addition, empirical evidence shows that the coastal community is bitter as the region has experienced many injustices, especially marginalization and exclusion over a long period. Indeed, the growing discontent in the region is historical and can be traced from the time of foreign domination to post-independence (Frontier Counties Development Council, 2014).

These and many other triggers make the region vulnerable and ready for any spark to ignite the brewing are in the conviction of liberation (Yablonsky, 2014). The growing recognition and awareness on this state of affairs has produced a rejection of the status quo, whilst generating anti-establishment individual and groups, some of who become
a threat to peace and security in the region. The manifestations of this growing resistance have been dynamic, from religious intolerance (IPK) to tribal clashes (Kaya Bombo, Mlungu Nipa clashes), culminating into a separatist attitude (MRC), radicalization and violent extremism (Hassan, 2014).
CHAPTER FIVE

5.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This was the final chapter of the study. It summarized the findings of the study, drew conclusions based on the analysis of the literature reviewed, provided recommendations as well as insight in the areas for further research. The following specific objectives guided the chapter: - to assess the predominant causes of poverty in Mombasa County; to find out the extent of poverty prevalence on violent extremism in Mombasa County; and to investigate the link between poverty and violent extremism in Mombasa County.

5.2 Summary of Recommendations

The coastal region has experienced marginalization in education, verifiably halfway on the grounds that "Christian" training, frequently driven by preachers, was not adequate to a great extent Muslim populace (Ruteere, 2013). As of now there stays low venture, low quality, poor enlistment and high rates of school drop-out because of destitution and social contrasts (Rugene, 2013). The Mombasa First County Integrated Development Plan (2013) takes note of that education levels are around 86.3%. Enrolment at essential and optional school is 81.1% and 32.5% separately. Schools are said to be under resourced regarding foundation. The consequences of the examination demonstrate that, sustained poverty reduction can't be accomplished except if equity of chance and access to fundamental administrations is guaranteed (World Social Situation, 2014).

Lessening imbalance should in this manner be unequivocally joined in approaches and projects aimed at poverty reduction. What's more, explicit intercessions might be required, for example, governmental policy regarding minorities in society; directed open interests in underserved regions and parts; access to assets that are not restrictive; and a cognizant exertion to guarantee that strategies and projects actualized need to give impartial chances to all (Ndulo, 2016). The examination has appeared frail in general framework for the nation implies that about all the country populace are compelled to depend alone subsistence cultivating for their own nourishment just as money related salary (Hesse, 2014). Occupations are rare, leaving
individuals with little open door for business. There are extensive deterrents for beginning an independent venture in Kenya also (Mwakio, 2014).

As per the results of the examination, radicalization and enrollment into brutal fanaticism is the first security danger in Mombasa (Malemba, 2014). Poverty is a scourge, and one that lopsidedly influences sub-Saharan Africa (Opondo, 2014). It is an immense and complex issue whose arms venture into numerous regions, including environmental change, practical improvement and essentially worldwide security (Gathura, 2014). The connection among neediness and savage radicalism is convincing, and implies that on the off chance that we need to address fanaticism, we should battle disparity as well (Adano, 2015). Previous or in infrequent cases current—willful enlisted people to radical associations, for example, Al Shabaab, Boko Haram or Ansar Dine were broke down in this examination. The consequences of the investigation demonstrated that neediness, absence of work, social insurance, training, security and lodging as explanations behind joining the radical gatherings, with not many referencing religious belief system (Mwenje, 2015).

Kenya as in numerous different nations, the locales recognized to be flashpoints for radicalization and savage fanaticism are synonymous with extraordinary poverty, high absence of education levels and under-interest in essential administrations (Benyawa, 2014). Most of those living in these areas have for quite a long time trusted themselves to be rejected from the national improvement plan. The examination commute home the truth that an emphasis on security-drove reactions to fanaticism can't give enduring arrangements, yet rather that defying the difficulties of radicalism and psychological militant dangers, especially in Mombasa, calls for activity on a scope of social, social, monetary and political fronts (Anneli, 2014).

The aftereffects of the investigation has noticed that the issue of land proprietorship in the seaside region of Kenya is referred to as one of the supporters of destitution and subsequently rough fanaticism (Cox, 2015). Land complaints mirroring the minimization of the waterfront district are a result of arrangements grasped by the progression of post-freedom government strategies. The issue of land has assumed a center job in social developments in the coast, for example, the Mombasa Republican Council and fanatic gatherings like Kaya Bombo in Kwale, and was referred to in the
Al Shabaab articulation supporting the strikes on heartland pioneers in Lamu (Krug, 2014).

5.3 Discussion

5.3.1 The Predominant Causes of Poverty in Mombasa County.

The coastal region has encountered marginalization in education, evidently most of the way because "Christian" preparing, every now and again determined by ministers, was not satisfactory, as it were, Muslim masses (Ruteere, 2013). Starting at now there remains low endeavor, low quality, poor enrollment and high rates of school drop-out on account of desperation and social complexities (Rugene, 2013). The Mombasa First County Integrated Development Plan (2013) observes that training levels are around 86.3%. Enrolment at fundamental and discretionary school is 81.1% and 32.5% independently. Schools are said to be under resourced with respect to establishment. The results of the examination exhibit that, continued destitution decrease can't be cultivated with the exception of if value of possibility and access to central organizations is ensured (World Social Situation, 2014).

The aftereffects of the investigation demonstrate that destitution rates in Mombasa are said to be around 38% as indicated by Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (2015) and joblessness was evaluated at 15% in 2009, in spite of the fact that this figure is likely not to speak to those in casual non-salaried work. The examination demonstrates that there is high work movement from the country regions among working age populace matured between 15-64 years, yet additionally numerous noncoastal individuals (Karongo, 2014). The story of wabara (up-nation individuals) and wapwani (beach front individuals) was basic in the talk on work as key state occupations were skewed against local people, and pariahs are frequently given the gifted or semi-talented business openings (Nthiga, 2013). The most well-known salaried enterprises incorporate privately-run companies, port, transport and the travel industry.

The County Integrated Development Plan (CIDP, 2014) makes reference to landlessness, surprising expense of living, absence of education/preparing, absence of access to credit, HIV/AIDS, sexual orientation separation, poor asset the management among others as key reasons for poverty in Mombasa county. The hospitality business has been especially hard hit by frailty at the coast and tourism warnings to maintain a
strategic distance from Kenya (Alvazzi, 2013). The aftereffects of the investigation noticed that People have been losing positions and individuals are eager. There is a great deal of joblessness and subsequently frailty (Lauren, 2015). Further, vast spontaneous settlements exist in the city and are developing; here living conditions are poor and vulnerabilities to wrongdoing and viciousness are high; these incorporate Kisauni, Bangladesh, Magogo, Likoni, Longo and Bamburi (Sharkey, 2015). The exact proof has noticed that the connection among destitution and wrongdoing and brutality is intricate and isn't specifically causal (Sharkey, 2015).

The investigation has appeared feeble in general foundation for the nation implies that almost all the country populace are compelled to depend individually subsistence cultivating for their own nourishment just as money related pay (Hesse, 2014). Occupations are rare, leaving individuals with little open door for business. There are significant hindrances for beginning an independent company in Kenya also (Mwakio, 2014). Smaller scale credits might be one approach to cultivate little business visionaries. They will be essential while destroying neediness in Kenya. As per Transparency International, Kenya is a standout amongst the most degenerate countries on the planet. It is troublesome for most of the populace to get away from the neediness in Kenya, when government cash is utilized inappropriately (Muturi, 2014).

5.3.2 The Extent of Poverty Prevalence on Violent Extremism in Mombasa County.

Empirical evidence contended that religious strains in Mombasa are firmly identified with the marginalization of indigenous people groups who for the most part recognize as Muslim, and their disdain of outcasts whom they see as having accepted land and open doors (Sodipo, 2014). Be that as it may, relations have been genuinely tranquil until late years with the ascent of fear mongering and Kenya's job in worldwide enemy of psychological oppression exercises, associated to the USA. Furthermore, the investigation has noticed that a critical neighborhood issue in religious pressure is counter-psychological warfare tasks by the state and the police as noted above, in which they are blamed for profiling of Muslims, and of submitting human-rights offenses including additional legal killings of Muslim ministers (Mutahi, 2014). As indicated by the aftereffects of the investigation, radicalization and enrollment into
rough fanaticism is the chief security danger in Mombasa (Malemba, 2014). For young people in Mombasa the principle concern is the high numbers who are being selected to join Al Shabaab for preparing or battle in Somalia (Lutta, 2013). Kenya Muslim Youth Alliance (2016) note that most of Kenya young people who have joined Al Shabaab have originated from seaside districts of Kilifi, Mombasa and Kwale. While some may have been frustrated with Al Shabaab, and maybe with its standards, others might be engaged with framing bases inside Kenya.

As per this examination, pastors in Mombasa have contended for every four to five houses there is a radicalization issue. The examination relates this to the tale of a Form 4 kid (matured 16) whose guardians watched him coming in late and after that carrying on oddly (Kumssa, 2014). Without further ado subsequently he vanished and the guardians got a short call from him saying "Where I am, I am sheltered, don't stress." They couldn't get back to (Leggesse, 2013). The situation is said to be a typical one, as the consequences of the examination noticed that there are such a significant number of vanishings of youth in Mombasa County. In spite of the fact that adolescents are among those radicalized, as per the harmony board, most generally the young people are more established than those associated with adolescent savagery (Jebet, 2014).

5.3.3 The Link Between Poverty and Violent Extremism in Mombasa County.

The analysis of the investigation has noticed that the issue of land possession in the coastal region of Kenya is referred to as one of the patrons of poverty and consequently brutal fanaticism (Cox, 2015). Land complaints mirroring the marginalization of the coastal front are a result of approaches grasped by the progression of post-freedom government strategies. The issue of land has assumed a center stage in social developments in the coast, for example, the Mombasa Republican Council and radical gatherings like Kaya Bombo in Kwale, and was referred to in the Al Shabaab articulation supporting the attacks on heartland pilgrims in Lamu (Krug, 2014). Actualizing the land changes commanded by the new constitution and the issuance of title deeds request quick thoughtfulness regarding address such long standing issues (Haskell, 2013).
The investigation noticed that fanaticism caused almost 33,000 deaths in Africa somewhere in the range of 2011 and 2016, with related relocation and monetary decimation causing a portion of the most exceedingly bad compassionate fiascos on the mainland. Various examinations demonstrate that expanding imbalance upsets monetary development and undermines social attachment, builds political and social pressures and drives insecurity and strife (Tumbo. 2016). The investigation has set up that poor administration and defilement is in charge of the absence of trust in the legislature, creating disappointment in numerous beach front networks (Omwami, 2013). Devolution under the 2010 Constitution was to give answers to the current administration shortfall (Nyanjom, 2014; and Bosire, 2013).

As indicated by the investigation, the arrangement of region governments has, be that as it may, encouraged world class networks where work openings are as yet dependent on support and advancement once in a while streams down to the underestimated families (Carranza, 2015). Al-Shabaab and other radical gatherings scouts go after disappointed individuals from networks, for example, youth who are baffled by the Kenya's political first class' way of life of exemption (Akwiri, 2015). Common society performing artists should in this way assume a functioning job with different partners, for example, conventional older folks and religious pioneers to improve checking of new advancements adding to the locale's minimization (Benyawa, 2013).

Regardless of the achievement of security segment hard reactions in incidentally suppressing rough fanaticism, the unpredictable execution of these activities applies unintended effects because of the radicalizing sway on honest people and in danger youth. They can likewise radicalize thoughtful gatherings or produce new branches of fanatic gatherings (Berg, 2013). Kenya's security segment must reassess its counterterrorism procedure's ramifications for underestimated gatherings, especially Somali Muslims and beach front Muslims (Badurdeen, 2017). This is essential for network policing endeavors that require ceaseless commitment with neighborhood networks. Network trust relies upon the validity of the security segment in regard to exhaustive and auspicious examinations concerning claims of discretionary confinement, attacks, captures, extrajudicial killings and use of torture by the security forces (Ayiera, 2015).
From the meta-examination of various research provides details regarding Violent extremism in the coastal region can be attributed to various factors including the effects of unchecked religious exercises and practices as predictable instructing in spots of worship, expected to radicalizing Muslim youngsters (Clarke, 2014). Additionally, observational confirmation exhibits that the ocean side system is extreme as the locale has experienced various despicable acts, especially marginalization and shirking over a broad stretch. Indeed, the creating discontent in the zone is chronicled and can be pursued from the period of remote control to post-opportunity (Frontier Counties Development Council, 2014). These and various distinctive triggers make the area frail and arranged for any radiance to contact off the mixing are in the conviction of opportunity (Yablonsky, 2014). The creating affirmation and care on this circumstance has made a rejection of existing conditions, while delivering guerilla individual and social occasions, some of who transform into a hazard to congruity and security in the region.

5.4 Conclusions

5.4.1 The Predominant Causes of Poverty in Mombasa County.

It is evident from the analysis that the legislature of Kenya has continuously put resources into social security programs for the maturing and other helpless gatherings. Somewhere in the range of 2013 and 2014, social security use in Kenya ascended from Kshs 33.4 billion to 57.1 billion, which was equal to 4.28 percent of (GDP) in 2014. The augmentation in budgetary assignment has contributed in diminishing neediness rates among these defenceless gatherings and furthermore ensuing increment in the quantity of recipients throughout the years.

Kenya being a part and signatory of UN (joined countries), AU (African association) and other worldwide human rights affirmation which advocate for government managed savings to every single defenceless groups that is, more established people and individuals living with handicap. It likewise underpins social security as a key human appropriate to each native (Mbondo, 2913). In 1982, the United Nations through its goals 37/51 met the primary ever World Assembly on Aging in Vienna Austria to deliver issues relating to more established people and their suggestions on national advancement.
The Kenyan government has additionally partaken in different revelations and arrangements which are educational in issues of social assurance approaches that assistance in strategizing programs towards the old individual which include: UN Principles of Older Persons, 1991; UN Proclamation on Aging, 1992; The Madrid International Plan of Action on Aging, 2002; The Livingstone Declaration of 2006 by the African Union gathering at Livingstone and Zambia (Barrientos, 2014). It is anyway inferred that greater part of OECD nations recorded a significant development in recipient populaces somewhere in the range of 2010 and 2015, especially the UK, Canada, Ireland, Germany and the Nordic nations.

5.4.2 The Extent of Poverty Prevalence on Violent Extremism in Mombasa County.

It is concluded that countries that have reduced poverty and improved living conditions on a broad scale have developed comprehensive social protection systems covering a majority of the population. For instance, on average, public social protection expenditure accounted for 27 per cent of GDP in Western Europe and 19 per cent in Northern America in 2015 (Geoff, 2014). Social security fund not only benefits people living in poverty, but promotes the well-being of societies at large. While the impact of Social security fund varies according to their design, the level of implementation and the adequacy of transfers, evidence from around the world shows their potential not only to prevent poverty, but also to reduce inequality and stimulate economic growth (Chiquita, 2015).

However, income insecurity prevents households from making productive investments and may lead them to forgo necessary health care and withdraw children from school. By helping people living in poverty to address trade-offs between meeting their immediate needs and securing future livelihoods, Social security fund measures can encourage the accumulation of productive assets and investment in physical and human capital, ease access to credit and help households to manage risk.

Benefits assume a vital job in neediness mitigation of the old - a standout amongst the most powerless gatherings in any general public, especially more seasoned ladies. However, as indicated by the universal work association (ILO), just a single in five laborers is secured by satisfactory government managed savings plans, while the

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World Bank (Holtzman and Hinz, 2014) point out that 85% of the total populace more than 65 has no retirement advantage by any stretch of the imagination. In sub-Saharan Africa Kenya included, under 10% of the more seasoned populace has a contributory annuity (Palacios, Pallares and Miralles, 2016).

5.4.3 The Link Between Poverty and Violent Extremism in Mombasa County.

From the meta-examination of different research reports on Violent fanaticism in the coastal front can be ascribed to numerous variables including the impacts of unchecked religious lessons and practices as consistent teaching in spots of church, aimed for radicalizing Muslim young people (Clarke, 2014). Moreover, observational proof demonstrates that the coastal network is severe as the region has encountered numerous shameful acts, particularly marginalization and avoidance over an extensive stretch. Without a doubt, the developing discontent in the area is chronicled and can be followed from the season of remote control to post-freedom (Frontier Counties Development Council, 2014). These and numerous different triggers make the region powerless and prepared for any sparkle to touch off the blending are in the conviction of freedom (Yablonsky, 2014). The developing acknowledgment and mindfulness on this situation has created a dismissal of existing conditions, while producing insurgent individual and gatherings, some of who turn into a risk to harmony and security in the area.

As per this examination, states turn out to be a piece of the issue in sustaining brutal fanaticism when establishments neglect to execute laws, come up short on the ability to viably indict wrongdoings identified with rough radicalism, or when they go past the current laws or resort to non-traditional ways for managing fierce fanaticism (Sodipo, 2013). These issues feed the aggregate complaints story of indigenous beach front networks and give the legitimization, fanatics misuse through stories concentrating on the out of line treatment by the legislature and law implementation officers. Such tricky state reactions towards fanaticism depend on the propensity to over-respond, bringing about powerless populaces feeling they are the objective of politically spurred and religiously one-sided security rehearses and unfair legal frameworks (UNDP, 2016)
5.5 Recommendations

5.5.1 Recommendation for Improvement

5.5.1.1 The Predominant Causes of Poverty in Mombasa County.

The results of the analysis show that, sustained poverty reduction cannot be achieved unless equality of opportunity and access to basic services is ensured (World Social Situation, 2014). Reducing inequality must therefore be explicitly incorporated in policies and programmes aimed at poverty reduction. In addition, specific interventions may be required, such as: affirmative action; targeted public investments in underserved areas and sectors; access to resources that are not conditional; and a conscious effort to ensure that policies and programmes implemented have to provide equitable opportunities for all (Ndulo, 2016).

5.5.1.2 The Extent of Poverty Prevalence on Violent Extremism in Mombasa County.

From the analysis, extremist groups may be used to describe a wide spectrum of activity, from simple gatherings of young people, to groups engaging in low-level criminal activities such as use of soft drugs or low-level territorial conflicts or petty crimes, and then at the extreme, to extremist groups involved in full-blown organized crime or violent extremism (Felson, 2015). Various factors leading to VE in Mombasa County have been identified among them: unemployment. The analysis has noted that there is also pressure to get money to buy drugs (Daballen, 2014). In the absence of money they kill. Empirical evidence suggest that some of the extremist groups did not usually have any political aims, although others noted that they were linked to politicians and even the security officers. This analysis suggest that there is need for the government to share resources equitably to eradicate poverty. Other stakeholders should also create job opportunities for the youth.

5.5.1.3 The Link Between Poverty and Violent Extremism in Mombasa County.

The connection among poverty and Violent Extremism is convincing, and implies that in the event that we need to address fanaticism, we should battle imbalance as well (Adano, 2015). Previous or in intermittent cases current– deliberate enlisted people to
fanatic associations, for example, Al Shabaab, Boko Haram or Ansar Dine were examined in this examination. The consequences of the investigation demonstrated that destitution, absence of business, social insurance, training, security and lodging as purposes behind joining the fanatic gatherings, with not very many referencing religious belief system (Mwenje, 2015).

5.5.2 Recommendations for Future Studies.

The investigation additionally prescribes progressively blended research strategy structures for effect assessments, as subjective information can empower a more exaggerated comprehension of the degree to which destitution impacts Violent Extremism in Kenya.
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